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Jazz tool inventory

Find the tool names to use in agent restrictions and approval grants. In chat, /tools shows the tools available to the current agent. Use jazz agent edit <name> to change its selected capabilities; use deniedTools to remove a specific tool.

Risk tiers determine what runs unattended. See Approvals and the security model.


At a glance

Count
Agent-facing tools 82
Hidden execute_* counterparts (the second half of each approval pair) 20
Internal: granted only to Jazz’s own /learn pass 1
Total registered 103
read-only 43
low-risk 20
high-risk 16
unknown 3

Plus, registered per agent rather than globally:

Source Tools Notes
Skills find_skills, load_skill, load_skill_section Present when the agent has skills available. See Skills loading
MCP mcp_<server>_<tool> Discovered from the agent’s tool list, connected lazily. See MCP
Custom whatever you define Agent-config customTools: see Agent configuration

How approval pairs work

Every tool above read-only is gated: under a policy that does not clear its level it asks first, or is declined (or parked) when nobody can answer. With no policy, or false, nothing clears. Gated tools include approval pairs and tools that ask before running directly.

The 12 approval pairs split proposing from acting: calling one does not act. It returns a description of the intended action (including a preview diff for edits), and only after approval, from a human or from the policy, does Jazz invoke the hidden execute_* counterpart. A plain gated tool has no proposal half: the executor asks with its name, risk level, and arguments, and runs the tool itself once approved.

Only the tool registered for an execute_* counterpart can ask for it. Any other tool output shaped like an approval request (an MCP server’s reply, a fetched JSON document) is refused and nothing runs.

You never call execute_* names yourself; they are hidden from the model’s tool list.


What each tool reveals

Risk is not the same question as disclosure. Risk asks what a tool can do to the machine; disclosure asks how freely its answer can be shared. The two do not correlate: read_file is read-only and can reveal anything, get_time is read-only and reveals nothing, write_file changes the machine and reveals nothing at all.

Level Safe to tell Tools
public safe to tell anyone add_reminder, cp, end_loop, mkdir, mv, propose_goal, report_goal_cycle, rm, web_fetch, web_search, write_file
internal the shape of this machine: paths, names, what is installed analyze_media, cancel_background_jobs, cancel_trigger, cancel_wait_for, cd, context_info, create_composition, create_pdf, find, generate_media, get_time, list_background_jobs, list_triggers, ls, pdf_page_count, publish_composition, pwd, register_trigger, search_tools, stat, who_is_here
private your own material: file contents, memory, schedule, transcripts, tool results ask_file_picker, ask_user_question, ask_user_secret, browser_act, browser_back, browser_close, browser_navigate, browser_screenshot, browser_snapshot, browser_tabs, cancel_reminder, computer_acknowledge_driver, computer_apps, computer_end, computer_foreground, computer_grant_app, computer_handoff, computer_input, computer_install_driver, computer_observe, computer_pointer, computer_wait, edit_file, execute_command, grep, http_request, list_reminders, list_saved_secrets, list_subagents, list_todos, manage_memory, manage_scratchpad, manage_todos, map_subagents, post_to_blackboard, propose_lesson, read_blackboard, read_file, read_pdf, retrieve_tool_result, run_background_jobs, spawn_subagent, steer_subagent, summarize_context, update_work_state, use_saved_secret, view_memory, view_scratchpad, wait_for, wait_subagents

What leaves the machine

Risk and disclosure are both about this end of the call: what a tool does to your machine, and what its answer would reveal. Neither asks about the request, and for a handful of tools the request is where your material would actually leave.

Sends Tools
yes browser_act, browser_navigate, computer_foreground, computer_input, computer_pointer, http_request, publish_composition, read_pdf, web_fetch, web_search

Three more, absent above only because they are registered per agent rather than globally: ask_peer (high-risk), whose whole purpose is to put your model’s words in front of somebody else’s agent; request_clarification (low-risk), offered only when a peer relationship is configured, which lets the agent ask a peer one question back before answering theirs; and every MCP tool, whatever its transport: where a server outside this codebase carries the model’s arguments is not knowable from here.

This changes nothing in the terminal: approval tiers read the risk column, and a read-only tool that fetches a URL is still auto-approved under --approval-policy read-only. It matters at exactly one door: a tool listed here is never granted to another person’s agent by a disclosure tier. It has to be named in that peer’s allow, the same as a tool that writes to disk. See Security model: how the ceiling is computed.

The same holds for manage_todos, update_work_state, manage_scratchpad and spawn_subagent. They are read-only for your own runs, but they write the agent’s durable bookkeeping or start child runs, so a peer reaches them only when its allow names them.


The tools

File Management

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
cd read-only none Change the working directory for this session. Persists across subsequent tool calls.
cp high-risk execute_cp Copy a file or directory recursively. low-risk unless force replaces an existing destination.
edit_file high-risk execute_edit_file Edit an existing file against the snapshot returned by read_file; reject stale state before approval or execution.
find read-only none Find files/directories by name, glob, or regex. Also advertised as glob. Searches names/paths, NOT contents (use grep).
grep read-only none Search file contents for text patterns (ripgrep with grep fallback). Supports regex, file filters, context…
ls read-only none List directory contents. Supports recursive traversal, name filtering, hidden files. Default 200 results, c…
mkdir low-risk execute_mkdir Create a directory. Parents created automatically by default.
mv high-risk execute_mv Move or rename a file or directory. low-risk unless force replaces an existing destination.
pdf_page_count read-only none Get total page count of a PDF without reading content.
pwd read-only none Print the current working directory.
read_file read-only none Read a UTF-8 text file with numbered lines and a full-file edit snapshot; sinceByte follows appended content.
read_pdf read-only none Extract text and tables from a PDF. Use pdf_page_count first for large files. Supports page ranges.
rm high-risk execute_rm Remove a file or directory. May be irreversible.
stat read-only none Check file/directory existence and get metadata (type, size, times).
who_is_here read-only none Check whether other jazz agents are working in a directory (who is here, and whether they are writing).
write_file high-risk execute_write_file Write content to a file, creating it if needed. Replaces entire file content.

Shell Commands

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
execute_command unknown execute_execute_command Run a shell command when no dedicated tool exists. Each command is classified read-only, low-risk, or high-risk, and the active tier then applies to that verdict. Stdout/stderr capped at 256 KB each.
wait_for unknown execute_wait_for Watch in the background until a command exits 0, re-running it on an interval as tight as 250 ms. Returns at once; the agent is woken when the condition holds or after 15 minutes at most.
cancel_wait_for low-risk none Cancel a pending wait_for by batch id (get the id from wait_for first).

wait_for checks once before it returns. If the condition already holds, nothing is scheduled. Otherwise the call returns that first check’s exit code and output, and keeps checking as a background job (the same worker as run_background_jobs). The agent keeps working and is woken with the last check’s output when the condition holds or the time runs out. If every check returned the same exit code and output, the wake message says so and tells the agent to test the check itself before waiting again.

Where the agent is woken depends on whether the conversation is open. In an interactive chat, the chat takes the turn itself the moment it is idle: the result appears in the transcript and any approval the turn needs is asked right there. A message you are typing stays in the composer. The same goes for a register_trigger wake-up that comes due while the chat is open. With no chat open (or after you leave it, or in a piped jazz session), the turn runs unattended as before and parks on the first approval it needs, waiting for jazz runs approve.

To watch a wait live in the fullscreen terminal, press down from an empty composer to reach the pending waits and press Enter on one. Its command and recent checks (exit code, age and output of each) replace the transcript and update as checks run; Esc goes back to the conversation. Elsewhere, /waits show <number> prints the same view once. cancel_wait_for cancels the batch that wait_for created; for waits longer than 15 minutes, register_trigger suspends the run and resumes it later.

In the interactive terminal, an operator can also type ! <command> (the space after ! is required). That explicit shell escape uses the same cwd resolution, environment sanitization, denylist, timeout, interruption, and output caps as execute_command, then gives the result to the agent as context. It is not available through jazz run or remote chat surfaces.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
web_search read-only none Search the web for real-time information.

Web Fetch

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
web_fetch read-only none Fetch and extract text content from a public URL.

HTTP

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
http_request high-risk none Send HTTP requests to public or private hosts. Supports all methods, headers, query params, and body formats. Requests run automatically unless a global URL approval list is configured.

Todo

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
list_todos read-only none Read the current todo list. Returns all items with their status and priority.
manage_todos read-only none Create or update the todo list. Send the FULL list of items each time (replaces the previous list). Use thi…
update_work_state read-only none Record where you are in the current task so it survives compaction and resuming later. Patches o…

Memory

Memory tools are in the built-in bundle. Deny manage_memory to prevent writes, and propose_lesson to stop lesson proposals. See Memory.

/learn also gives its own pass revise_memory, which no agent receives: it queues the removal of a duplicated, contradicted or stale entry, or a rewrite of a lesson, for you to keep or drop in the same checklist.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
view_memory read-only none Consult relevant memory when prior context could improve the answer.
manage_memory low-risk none Create with an explicit relevance topic, or amend, delete, or rename. A create or amend stores a one-sentence summary backed by one or more exact quotes from authenticated user input. The receipt shows a diff of the entry: the new entry for a create, old and new for an amend, the removed entry for a delete.
propose_lesson low-risk none Queue a rule the agent drew from its own mistake for you to review. Writes nothing to memory: the lesson is saved only when you accept it with /memory accept or jazz memory accept. The end-of-conversation and compaction passes may call it without asking.

update_work_state lives with the todo tools (always-on). It is scoped to one conversation and discarded when the task ends, unlike memory which persists across conversations. See Context management.

Workspace

Scratchpad tools are in the built-in bundle. Use them for working drafts, research material, and intermediate files that should persist across conversations.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
view_scratchpad read-only none View your durable scratchpad: drafts, research dumps and intermediate artifacts too large for memory.
manage_scratchpad read-only none Save durable working drafts, research dumps, or intermediate artifacts too large or provisional…

Reminders

Opt-in per agent. Reminders persist on disk and fire later on the same surface that scheduled them. See Reminders.

For CLI-hosted agents, add_reminder installs the same real one-shot host-scheduler job (launchd on macOS, an at job on Linux) used for wake triggers, so a reminder fires even if jazz daemon isn’t running; firing sends a native OS desktop notification instead of resuming a conversation: a reminder is “notify a person,” never “resume the agent.” jazz daemon’s in-process ticker remains a fallback for hosts with neither launchd nor at. Telegram and Discord reminders are unaffected by any of this: their bots already sweep and deliver reminders as chat messages from their own in-process interval, unchanged.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
add_reminder low-risk none Schedule a reminder from a duration (30m), clock time (18:00), tomorrow HH:MM, a weekday (tue 20:00), or an absolute 2026-08-25 20:00.
list_reminders read-only none List this person’s pending reminders, including their id, fire time, and text.
cancel_reminder low-risk none Cancel a pending reminder by id (get the id from list_reminders first).

Goals and loops

The agent proposes a goal when a request needs sustained work across several runs. The goal is saved as proposed and nothing runs until the user accepts the plan: chat asks right after the turn, and jazz goal accept <id> accepts it elsewhere. Subagents and goal cycles cannot propose goals. A goal’s own cycles get report_goal_cycle, which says where the goal stands (Jazz checks the claim against the cycle’s tool output), and a loop’s own runs get end_loop, which stops the loop after the run; nothing else has either, and no tool can start a loop. See Goals and loops and jazz loop.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
propose_goal low-risk none Propose a plan (objective, observable criteria, milestones) for work that must continue over time. Only in interactive chat and jazz run --propose-goals.
end_loop low-risk none End the loop the run belongs to, with the reason shown to the user. Only in runs a loop started.
report_goal_cycle low-risk none Report the goal’s status at the end of a cycle: continue, complete (with evidence quoted from tool output), blocked, or a question. Only in goal cycles.

Wake Triggers

Opt-in per agent. A trigger causes the agent to actually run again with a given prompt, resuming the exact conversation it was scheduled from: unlike a reminder, which just delivers a note to a person. See Reminders for how the two compare.

register_trigger does not depend on jazz daemon running to actually fire. Registering a trigger installs a real one-shot job with the host’s own scheduler: a launchd job on macOS, an at job on Linux: that fires the trigger by invoking jazz directly at the scheduled time, even if nothing else is running. jazz daemon’s in-process ticker remains a fallback for platforms or environments with neither launchd nor the at binary available (most containers, some CI), and scheduling with the host is always best-effort: if it fails for any reason, registration still succeeds and the ticker is the safety net.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
register_trigger low-risk none Schedule yourself to wake up later and resume this exact conversation. Use this when you need to…
list_triggers read-only none List this agent’s pending self-scheduled wake triggers.
cancel_trigger low-risk none Cancel a pending wake trigger by id (get the id from list_triggers first).

Background Jobs

Background-job tools are in the built-in bundle. run_background_jobs starts independent shell commands in a detached worker, with bounded concurrency and retries. When all jobs finish, the agent resumes its conversation with their statuses and output.

No daemon is required to start a batch. The daemon can recover a batch whose worker stopped. If the resumed turn needs approval, it parks and sends a notification; answer with jazz runs approve <id>. See Deferred work.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
run_background_jobs unknown execute_run_background_jobs Run several independent shell commands in the background with a concurrency cap and per-job retry/backoff.
list_background_jobs read-only none List this agent’s background job batches, every job’s status, and what each one printed.
cancel_background_jobs low-risk none Cancel a job batch’s pending jobs by id (jobs already running finish naturally).

Context

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
context_info read-only none Report context window usage and the usage at which history is compacted; also shown after every compaction.
get_time read-only none Get current date and time, plus workMinutesLeft when the run has a time budget. Use for scheduling, relative times (yesterday, next Monday), and timestamps.
retrieve_tool_result read-only none Read a tool body that was offloaded from context or cut to fit it, a page at a time by offset.
Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
search_tools read-only none Fetch full parameter schemas for deferred tools (MCP servers, background jobs, etc.) you can see by name in your tool list but haven’t fetched yet.

Sub Agents

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
spawn_subagent read-only none Spawn a sub-agent with fresh context for a specific task. Personas: coder, researcher, default. Returns an agentId at once; collect the answer with wait_subagents. Optionally validate a bounded JSON handoff with resultSchema, pick another model from the same provider with model, and cap the child with maxMinutes, maxCostUSD and maxOutputTokens.
map_subagents read-only none Run one brief over a list of inputs (up to 100): one child per input, sharing persona, model, limits and resultSchema. {{input}} in the brief marks where each input goes. Children past maxLiveSubagents queue and start as earlier ones finish.
list_subagents read-only none Show each sub-agent of the run: status, current activity, spend so far and the id its saved answer is kept under once finished.
wait_subagents read-only none Wait for sub-agents (until any or all) and return each answer once, as a preview naming how to read the whole answer when the answers are long. It has no time limit of its own: the children settling, a user message, or the run’s time budget ends the wait.
steer_subagent read-only none Message, pause, resume or cancel a running sub-agent. Messages and pauses take effect before its next model call.
post_to_blackboard read-only none Post a finding (topic + up to 4,000 characters) to the board the parent and its sub-agents share. A post from a run that has read external content is marked untrusted.
read_blackboard read-only none Read the shared board oldest first, optionally by topic; afterId returns only newer posts.
summarize_context read-only none Compact conversation by summarizing older messages to free token budget. Always performs summarization when…

Perception Delegation

Always-on. Lets an agent borrow specialist perception or generation from another model.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
analyze_media high-risk execute_analyze_media Delegate image/audio/video analysis to a capable companion and return its textual answer. The person at the keyboard picks the model; a pre-bound analyze:* companion routes there without a picker.
generate_media high-risk execute_generate_media Delegate image/audio/video generation to a capable companion and return its files as artifacts. The person at the keyboard picks the model; a pre-bound generate:* companion routes there without a picker.

User Interaction

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
ask_file_picker read-only none Show an interactive file picker for the user to select a file.
ask_user_question read-only none Ask the user a question with interactive selectable suggestions. One question per call.
ask_user_secret read-only none Ask the user to type a password, token or passphrase, hidden. Returns a [redacted:<name>] placeholder, never the value.
list_saved_secrets read-only none List the secrets saved for every agent (jazz secrets): names and descriptions, never values.
use_saved_secret high-risk execute_use_saved_secret Load a saved secret into the run as its [redacted:<name>] placeholder. Always asks a person, under every policy, unless the run allows reading secrets.

Compositions

Enable Compositions per agent to create interactive HTML pages or static images. The bundled composition skill supplies design instructions.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
create_composition low-risk none Compose a polished visualization, interactive explainer, dashboard, form, or small tool as a static image or live HTML artifact.
create_pdf high-risk none Render a PDF from HTML the agent writes, saved to the working directory or an explicit path. Text and numbers are exact: a renderer, not an image generator.
publish_composition high-risk none Publish a composition to a stable URL. Public → GitHub Pages or Cloudflare Pages; private → a private repo behind Cloudflare Access. First use creates the repo, project, and Access gates. Private protection is verified before pushing; Cloudflare deployments retain all composition pages and propagate failures. Needs gh, git, and (for Cloudflare) ~/.config/jazz/cloudflare.json. See Publishing.

Browser

Enable Browser Use per agent to drive real web pages. The tools load on demand and are off by default.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
browser_navigate low-risk none Open an http(s) URL in the run’s browser and return its URL and title.
browser_back low-risk none Go back one page in the browser’s history.
browser_snapshot read-only none Read the current page as a text outline with a ref on every interactive element.
browser_screenshot low-risk none Save a PNG of the current page and return its path for analyze_media.
browser_tabs low-risk none List, switch between, and close the run’s named tabs. list is read-only. Open a new tab by giving browser_navigate a new tab name.
browser_act high-risk execute_browser_act Click, type, choose an option, or press a key. Typed secrets from ask_user_secret are entered only after you approve, on https pages.
browser_close read-only none Close the browser and discard its cookies and session.

browser_adopt_tab (high-risk, pair execute_browser_adopt_tab) is registered only when browser.endpoint points at a browser the user runs: it lets the agent take over one existing tab the user names, after a separate approval showing the tab’s title and URL. The agent sees only tabs it created or adopted, never the rest of the user’s browser.

Computer use (experimental)

Enable Computer use per agent to look at and act in desktop apps you grant. It is experimental, runs on macOS with Apple Silicon only, and exists only in a terminal conversation with you watching. Enabling the tools acknowledges computer use; the first successful session pins the driver digest automatically. Only a changed driver build requires computer_acknowledge_driver approval. The tools load on demand and are off by default.

Tool Risk Approval pair What it does
computer_apps read-only none List the apps you granted, what each allows, and their visible windows.
computer_observe read-only none Read one window of a granted app as a text outline with refs, and optionally save a screenshot.
computer_pointer low-risk execute_computer_pointer Click an element or pixel, or scroll, in the background without moving your cursor.
computer_wait read-only none Wait until the last observed window settles or changes, then return a fresh observation. No action is performed.
computer_grant_app low-risk none Lasting grant for one app (in-chat approval).
computer_install_driver high-risk none Install the cua-driver binary (in-chat approval).
computer_acknowledge_driver high-risk none Approve a changed driver build by digest in chat; not needed on first use. Always asks.
computer_input high-risk execute_computer_input Type into an element or press a named key or shortcut. A typed secret is entered only after you approve.
computer_foreground high-risk execute_computer_foreground Bring a granted app to the front, then click, scroll, type or press a key. The app needs a foreground grant.
computer_handoff low-risk execute_computer_handoff Pause and ask you to do a step yourself, such as signing in. Always asks, and clears every earlier observation.
computer_end read-only none Stop using the computer: close the driver, delete this run’s screenshots, and release the desktop.

What is not a built-in tool

A common and consequential misreading. These capabilities exist, but not as built-in tools: they are skills that shell out through execute_command, which is unknown:

Capability How it actually works Effective risk tier
Email (read, archive, send) email skill → Himalaya CLI via execute_command unknown
Calendar (list, create) calendar skill → khal via execute_command unknown
Obsidian vault writes obsidian skill → CLI via execute_command, or write_file unknown / high-risk

Jazz classifies each CLI command before applying the run’s approval policy. Read-only commands may run at read-only; mailbox or calendar changes can require human approval. Grant specific commands only when you understand their scope. A grant for an entire binary such as himalaya also permits its mutation commands. See email and calendar setup.


Notes

  • Whole-file write approvals survive restarts. write_file binds approval to the original file bytes, path and replacement content. A parked run restores that snapshot when resumed in another process. If the file changed, execution returns StaleFileError and leaves it intact. Older parked approvals without a snapshot are refused; read the file and request a new write.

  • Editing a file another agent may change: Pass the snapshot from a text read_file unchanged to edit_file, even if you read only a line range. A stale snapshot returns StaleFileError without writing or asking for approval; read again and retry. Append reads and media attachments do not produce snapshots. Jazz serializes its own edits; writes from other programs can still conflict.

  • Following a file that is still being written: read_file with sinceByte returns appended bytes, plus nextByte and inode for the next read. On truncation or rotation it restarts at byte 0 and reports the change. A nonzero sinceByte cannot be combined with startLine or endLine.

  • find vs grep: find locates files by name, glob, or path pattern. grep searches inside file contents.

  • Shell command approval: Jazz classifies each command as read-only, low-risk, or high-risk, then applies the active approval policy. Interactive chat shows the classification while it runs and the result afterwards. Timeouts and ambiguous classifications remain high-risk. See Approvals.

  • HTTP requests and page fetches run automatically by default. http_request and web_fetch have the same global network.httpApproval policy, independent of method, risk tier, private destinations, prior untrusted content, or unattended execution. A configured URL array requires one-call approval outside its grants; approving never changes the list. Each redirect must match a grant too. Both tools strip credential/custom headers across origins, refuse forwarding bodies across origins, and cap response bytes and read time. web_fetch extracts page content as markdown; http_request preserves API response structure and supports methods, headers and bodies. See HTTP approvals.

  • Other model-chosen URLs use private-destination guards. read_pdf with a URL and rendered pages resolve each hostname, check every redirect, and require approval for unlisted private addresses. Approving adds those addresses to global network.allowPrivateHosts. The same credential and body limits apply. See Secrets and egress.

  • Secret values never reach the model. Files read normally, including .env and secrets.json. Every tool result is redacted before it is logged or shown: secrets Jazz holds (keyring-held peer, webhook and notify secrets included) and credential-named environment variables are replaced exactly; .env and YAML assignments, key formats, JWTs, webhook URLs and private keys by shape; and strings under secret-named keys in structured results, each as [redacted:<name>]. Tools redact before they cut or search: read_file line ranges, sinceByte offsets and caps, execute_command output caps, and grep and replace_pattern matching all work on the redacted text, so no slice splits a secret and no pattern can probe one. write_file and edit_file refuse a placeholder standing for a secret of the target file or one Jazz knows, and write_file refuses to drop a line holding a secret; change such files with edit_file around the placeholder lines. See Secrets and egress.

  • Secrets the person types stay out of the model. ask_user_secret reads the value hidden and gives the model [redacted:<name>]. It is also saved to the keyring under the name the agent gives it, for later runs, which load it with use_saved_secret after you approve. The value is held in memory for the rest of the run, redacted exactly from every tool result and log line, and put back only into the arguments a tool declares for it, just before that tool runs: password of read_pdf and pdf_page_count, and command of execute_command, which then always asks a person, whose approval shows the placeholder. Any other tool or argument carrying the placeholder is refused. See Secrets the person types.

  • Jazz’s own config always asks. write_file, edit_file, mv, cp and rm changing config.json or Jazz’s state under $JAZZ_HOME ask for approval under every policy, yolo included. Authored content (skills, workflows, personas, memory, workspace and generated output) follows the ordinary policy.

  • Outside content arrives labelled. Results from web_fetch, web_search, http_request, read_pdf URLs, MCP tools, ask_peer, every execute_command and custom command, and read_file of a file outside the working directory come back inside an <untrusted-content> envelope that names the source, and the system prompt tells the model to read them as data. Once a run has read external content, other egress tools stop auto-approving below high-risk. Because Jazz cannot tell what a command read, that includes any shell command: after one, other egress at read-only or low-risk needs approval. See Unattended runs.

  • Timeouts: 3 minutes by default per tool. Questions, secret prompts, file pickers and wait_subagents wait without a timeout. execute_command and wait_for accept at most 15 minutes; larger timeouts are rejected. In an interactive chat, an execute_command still running after 45 seconds moves to the background and its result arrives in the conversation when it finishes (see Sending a tool call to the background); the 15 minute limit still applies to it.

  • Stopping a command: execute_command and custom command tools run in their own process group. Esc, a tool timeout, --timeout, SIGTERM, or a run’s maxDurationMs deadline stops the command together with every process it started: SIGTERM first, and SIGKILL 3 seconds later if it is still running, so a command can finish writing and clean up. write_file, edit_file, cp and mv replace their target in one step, so a stopped call leaves the old version or the new one, never half a file. A file write_file or edit_file replaces keeps its permissions; one they create gets 0666 narrowed by the process umask (0644 under the usual 022), like a file made with touch. The tool results then say which calls completed, which were interrupted, and which never started. A command that leaves a job running in the background (server &) returns as soon as the shell exits, and the job keeps running.

  • Concurrency: up to 10 tools execute in parallel per iteration.

  • PDF rendering: create_pdf requires Chrome. Output goes to the working directory unless an explicit path overrides it.

  • Composition rendering: mode: "static" requires Google Chrome or PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH; mode: "interactive" needs no browser. Compositions live under ~/.jazz/compositions/<session-id>/. Jazz opens a completed composition automatically only in an interactive local terminal.


Time-zone names must be region identifiers such as America/New_York, or UTC; ambiguous abbreviations such as EST are rejected. A request-local tool parameter is reported as tool-argument, distinct from a stored chat setting or operator default. It does not establish a verified user preference or save a chat setting. Invalid time syntax is rejected before asking the user for a zone.

machine-readable: /jazz/docs/tools.md · /llms.txt · /llms-full.txt